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Abstract
The di￿usion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) associated with
the di￿usion of new work practices since ￿fteen years has raised concerns about the impact
of these changes on productivity. Some recent studies underline a positive impact of ICT
and of new work practices on ￿rms’ productivity. But as well known in the principal-agent
literature agents are predisposed to shirking, so, in order to obtain productivity gains ￿rms
need to provide workers with su￿cient incentives and to encourage motivations. Our main
results, obtained with data collected in Luxembourg in 2004-2005, indicate that ICT per-
mit to create a team spirit and an enriching work environment that in￿uences positively
pure intrinsic motivations of workers. These motivations, associated with positive incen-
tives, can be substitutes for the direct monitoring introduced usually to obtain the e￿ort
of employees, but hard to be used in a context of increasing autonomy.
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RØsumØ
La di￿usion, depuis une quinzaine d’annØes, des Technologies de l’Information et de
la Communication (TIC) associØe ￿ la di￿usion des pratiques innovantes de travail a con-
duit de nombreux auteurs ￿ s’interroger sur le r￿le jouØ par les TIC dans la productivitØ
des entreprises et ￿ mettre en Øvidence un impact positif. Mais comme le souligne les
modŁles d’agence, les individus sont prØdisposØs ￿ ￿tirer au ￿anc￿. En consØquence, pour
obtenir des gains de productivitØ, l’entreprise doit fournir les incitations su￿santes tout
en encourageant les motivations des salariØs. Nos principaux rØsultats, obtenus ￿ partir de
donnØes collectØes au Luxembourg en 2004-2005, montrent que l’usage des TIC est pos-
itivement corrØlØ avec le dØveloppement d’un esprit d’Øquipe et favorise la crØation d’un
environnement de travail enrichissant facilitant ainsi le dØveloppement des motivations
intrinsŁques des salariØs. Ces motivations, associØes ￿ des incitations positives, peuvent
remplacer la surveillance directe introduite gØnØralement pour obtenir l’e￿ort des salariØs
mais di￿cile ￿ mettre en ￿uvre dans un contexte d’autonomie croissante.
Mots clØs : Technologies de l’information et de la communication, incitations, motiva-
tions
Codes JEL : O33, J81, L22
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1. Introduction
The fast di￿usion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in ￿rms, allowed
notably by the declining price for its use, seems to favor the productivity of the ￿rm. Several
works present evidence supporting a positive e￿ect of ICT on productivity at the ￿rm level
(Greenan and Mairesse, 2000; Licht and Moch, 1999; Lichtenberg, 1995). However, the di￿u-
sion of ICT has been combined with changes in the organisational structure of ￿rms with the
increasing use of so called high performance work organization ( Askenazy, 2004; Osterman,
2000). As these changes might be another determinant of the increase of productivity, recent
empirical studies analyze the joint e￿ects of ICT and workplace reorganization. They underline
that ICT combined with workplace reorganization have positive and signi￿cant e￿ects on pro-
ductivity at the ￿rm level (Askenazy and Gianella, 2000; Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004; Black and
Lynch, 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). Moreover,
Aral, Brynjolfsson, and Van Alstyne (2007) show that ICT use furthers information di￿usion
in networks of workers and strengthen the productivity and the performance of individuals.
To obtain these productivity gains and to assure their competitiveness, ￿rms need to provide
the proper incentives and motivations for workers. Thanks to these incentives and motivations
the ￿rm can solve the problem of shirking and can manage the creation and transfer of knowl-
edge. However, the problem of shirking is complicated in the context of wide technological and
organisational changes. The di￿usion of ICT associated with workplace reorganization involves
a change from a ￿Tayloristic￿ work organization, characterized by task specialization, a pyrami-
dal hierarchical structure, and a centralization of responsibilities, to a ￿Holistic￿ organization
with multi-tasking, job rotation, the decentralization of decision-making, team work, more ￿ex-
ibility for the employer and greater communication between workers ( Askenazy, 2004). Conse-
quently, the relationships between employers and employees have changed. As workers became
more versatile (Lindbeck and Snower, 1996, 2000) and more autonomous (Caroli, Greenan, and
Guellec, 2001) the contracts became more incomplete and the evaluation of workers performance
more di￿cult.
As well known in the principal-agent literature, since workers know their own ability levels
2while employers may not, since it is costly to measure their performances, and since they
prefer leisure to e￿ort, agents are predisposed to shirk. Consequently, they can choose the
actions that are not in the best interest of the employer. The ￿rm exists in a large part
to provide the proper incentives to obtain the optimal provision of workers’ e￿ort when the
information on workers’ performance is costly 1. In order to reduce the agency problem, the
principal can use monitoring, compensations and/or promotions. This principal-agent view
can be extended with the introduction of the concept of motivations, largely neglected by the
economic literature. These motivations widely analyzed by organisational psychologists can be
substitutes of incentives and can consequently a￿ect e￿ort. Building on Frey (1997), Minkler
(2003, 2004) introduced both incentives and motivations in the analysis of the provision of
e￿ort at work. Moreover, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) formalize the impact of incentives and
motivations in workers’ utility to provide a high or a low level of e￿ort according to their initial
motivations to work in the interest of the ￿rm.
In this paper, we seek to provide an analysis of the e￿ects of ICT and of the changes they
crystallize on the incentives and motivations the ￿rm need to manage in order to solve the
problem of shirking, and in the creation and transfer of knowledge, which are necessary for
￿rms’ productivity and competitiveness.
We perform our analysis on a representative sample of individuals working in Luxembourg
surveyed in 2004-2005. Our dataset comes from the European Social Survey collected by
the CEPS/Instead2. A ￿rst evaluation of the consequence of ICT on di￿erent indicators of
incentives and motivations to obtain the optimal e￿ort is computed by comparing the average
value of various indicators for workers who use ICT (computer, Internet) and for workers
who do not. However, this benchmark estimator raises some selection problems induced by
workers’ and ￿rms’ heterogeneity. We choose to perform probit regressions to analyse the links
between ICT use and the di￿erent incentives and motivations, including a number of controls
like age, education, seniority and ￿rm’s characteristics like proxies of organisational changes.
But another problem stems from the fact that the impact of ICT may not be linear. In this case,
as Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) recommend, we use propensity score matching
estimators. Our main results highlight, on the one hand, that the introduction of ICT is
linked with the di￿culty to control the work of employees. Thus, it drives ￿rms to modify
their incentives mechanisms. On the other hand, the results show that ICT use is correlated
with more positives incentives, like promotions. Moreover, by o￿ering the access to ICT to
its employees, the ￿rm creates an enriching work environment that in￿uences positively pure
intrinsic motivations of workers. These pure intrinsic motivations, associated with the positive
1This cost can result from the costly evaluation of performance ( Calvo and Wellisz, 1978), the unobservability
of worker performance (Holmstr￿m, 1982) or the opportunism of team members under revenue-sharing ( Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972).
2CEPS/Instead: Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies/International Networks for Stud-
ies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development.
3incentives can be substitutes for the direct supervision introduced usually to obtain the optimal
e￿ort of employees. Moreover, the results show that ICT can be a part of the management
policy of the ￿rm that a￿ects the identi￿cation of workers with their organisation in order to
obtain behaviours matched with the interest of the ￿rm.
The paper is organized as follows. Some theoretical considerations on the relationships
between incentives, motivations and the provision of e￿ort in the context of technological and
organisational changes are provided in section 2. Section 3 provides a detailed description of
the database. Section 4 presents the econometric methods. Section 5 discusses the results and
the last section concludes.
2. Incentives and motivations in the context of technolog-
ical and organisational changes
2.1. Incentives
Incentives are widely discussed in the agency theory ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pren-
dergast, 1999). Incentives are provided to workers through two options, a negative incentive
(monitoring) and another one more positive (wage bonus, promotions). The principal will invest
in such incentives in order to induce workers to operate in the ￿rm’s interest. An underlying
assumption in this literature is that, in the absence of monitoring agents will shirk but they
will respond to an incentive in the principal’s interest.
The control of productivity can be objective with the pay-for-performance practice included
in an explicit contract. Since it is di￿cult to specify all aspects of the job in an explicit contract
and since it is less costly to monitor employees’ e￿ort than to measure their marginal product,
the subjective monitoring option by superior is generally used ( Calvo and Wellisz, 1978). To
be e￿ective the monitoring needs to be combined with penalties when it shows that the work
is substandard.
The positive incentive option rewards workers for e￿ort by means of monetary incentives like
salary revision or bonus; or through promotions by acting on the career concerns of workers.
Wage increases could act as a positive incentive by increasing the expected reward of e￿ort
provision by workers (Minkler, 2004). But, as workers exert e￿ort not just to maximize their
pay but also to a￿ect future contracts, the ￿rm can use career concerns in order to mitigate
the agency problem (Fama, 1980; Holmstr￿m, 1982).
In the context of technological and organisational changes, the connectivity to Internet of
workers is increasing. Consequently, it gives workers more opportunities to shirk like the use of
Internet for personal purpose instead of working. To obtain optimal e￿ort provision, ￿rms need
4to provide workers with su￿cient incentives, especially in the current context of high churn
rates for workers (Bauer and Bender, 2004). As technological changes in￿uence the increase
of workers’ autonomy (Gollac, Mangematin, Moatty, and De Saint-Laurent , 1999), they alter
the incentives schemes the ￿rm sets up. The direct supervision becomes more di￿cult, so
￿rms need to mobilize innovative modes of monitoring. In the current context of strategies like
the just-in-time one, the stress of the time limit can replace the authority of the superior. If
monitoring is more di￿cult, ￿rms can instead use positive incentives like promotions or wage
bonus to reward ex post the e￿ort of workers and to retain workers who developed speci￿c
competences thanks to ICT use.
Hypothesis 1. The use of ICT by workers should change the incentives schemes and should
decrease the direct supervision of workers.
Hypothesis 2. The use of ICT in the ￿rm should in￿uence positively the probability of
using positive incentives to obtain optimal e￿ort of workers.
2.2. Motivations
The standard theory of the ￿rm does not di￿erentiate the di￿erent sources of motivation,
which are, in the economic view, just the manifestations of underlying preferences (for the
reward associated with performing the task). While economists have greatly neglected these
psychological e￿ects on the level of e￿ort, the concept of motivation has already been analyzed
by organisational psychologists. Research on motivation has distinguished intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation. Intrinsic motivations are in￿uenced by the work itself. Extrinsic motivation is
motivation gained by externally in￿uenced need satisfaction. Following Deci (1971) ￿one is said
to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except
the activity itself ￿ (p.105). As shown is the crowding theory (Frey, 1997), incentives can crowd
out the motivations to undertake an activity and the ￿rm does not have to neglect their e￿ects
because it will a￿ect e￿ort (Cools, Van Herpen, and Van Praag, 2005). The crosspollination
by combining social psychology and economics is consequently necessary because the crowding
out e￿ect predicts reverse reactions of workers to the one expected in the agency theory.
2.2.1. Intrinsic motivations
In this paragraph, we will analyze both pure intrinsic motivations in the tradition of social
psychologists and moral motivations introduced by Minkler (2004).
Pure intrinsic motivations come from within the person in bond with his job. Workers, who
￿nd their work interesting will enjoy it and can consequently choose to do good work for its
own sake. So they are supposed to be intrinsically motivated. Following Frey (1997), external
interventions, that is to say incentives, can increase or ￿crowd in￿ intrinsic motivations or quite
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of e￿ort. In the ￿rst, the worker feels that his involvement and competence is appreciated
by employers (possibilities of promotions). This token of trust favours freedom of actions and
so can increase intrinsic motivation and strengthen the provision of e￿ort. In the second, the
agent perceives that the external intervention like monitoring shifts the locus of control from the
agent to the principal. As the worker become a ￿pawn￿ to the source of external, he responds
by reducing what he has control over, i.e. intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Minkler, 2004).
Concerning the e￿ect on e￿ort, if the incentives schemes reduce worker’s intrinsic motivation
more than they induce him to perform, e￿ort provision will decrease.
As technological and organisational changes are associated with greater freedom in orga-
nizing one’s own work and in diversifying tasks (Caroli et al., 2001; Greenan and Walkowiak,
2005; Lindbeck and Snower, 1996, 2000), it will increase the interest of the job and it can,
consequently, boost employee intrinsic motivation. The crowd in e￿ect will be reinforced by
the necessity of using reward mechanisms for employees with the competencies needed by the
￿rm in the context of skills upgrade in organization and of high churn rate. The crowd out ef-
fect is more ambiguous. As the introduction of technological and organisational changes imply
more autonomy and self-determination, workers should be more subject to control ( Bradley,
2000). But the modes of control have changed and the monitoring is no more ful￿lled by the
supervision of superior, but more by time pressure, so the feeling of being supervised is less
oppressive than the one that induce the traditional crowd out e￿ect.
Hypothesis 3. ICT di￿usion should in￿uence positively workers’ intrinsic motivations,
and thereby their provision of e￿ort.
More than the work ethic embedded in intrinsic motivations, Minkler (2004) introduces
moral motivations in the debate on workers willingness to work hard. Workers’ choices can be
independent of personal welfare considerations, and commitment or duty can motivate moral
actions without taking in to account incentives schemes. The integrity of workers can be a
reason for moral actions (Minkler and Miceli, 2004). Integrity confers commitments to moral
principles like honesty, or a ￿don’t lie￿ principle. It in￿uences both the propensity to make
promises and to keep them. People can keep their word even if it is contrary to the self-interest.
Experimental repeated games provide some evidence on situations in which the standard self-
interest model is refuted. According to Sally’s ( 1995) meta-analysis, ￿language may elicit an
involuntary commitment to act nonsel￿shly ￿ (p.87). If there is a commitment to work hard, as
shirking is analogous to dishonesty or lying, workers may choose to provide optimal e￿ort.
According to Bradley (2000) ￿ICT should contribute to the deepening and development
of true human qualities and provide time for people to develop themselves as human beings ￿
(p.856), the link between these changes and moral principles is however hypothetical and needs
further investigations.
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that it will change the honesty of workers or his ￿don’t lie￿ principle. Therefore, the e￿ect of
ICT on moral motivations is quite hypothetical.
2.2.2. Extrinsic motivations
Following Frey and Jegen (2001) extrinsic motivation comes from outside the person. So,
we can include both the concept of external pressure of the group and the concept of reciprocity
(Minkler, 2004) in this de￿nition.
According to Minkler (2004) ￿workers who care about the views of other workers are subject
to peer pressure￿ (p.870). This external pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992) most likely appears
in ￿rms that use pro￿t sharing like in teams, because each worker’s e￿ort a￿ects negatively all
other worker’s income or well-being (as shirking requires increased e￿ort form others). Kandel
and Lazear (1992) identify shame, as possible explanations of this external impact. For Rob
and Zemsky (2002), individuals’ preference for cooperation or for team spirit can explain what
encourage workers to provide a high level of e￿ort. As external pressure can be a substitute for
direct monitoring ￿rms need to stimulate the deployment of a team spirit with the formation
of groups in which members can identify with one another. Following Minkler (2004), to favour
this team spirit ￿rms can, for example, use quality circles, team meetings, inter-company sport
leagues, company picnics,...If the ￿rm succeeds in infusing this team spirit in the organization,
the feeling of shame can replaced the use of the external penalties for substandard work to
encourage e￿ort. This feeling arise when shirkers would su￿er from letting down their co-
workers.
As network technologies contribute to codify tasks, knowledge, and to collect information,
they stimulate electronic communications and allow workers to get more easily help from col-
leagues when it is needed. Moreover, a member of an organisation can easily relays to other
member information concerning substandard work and it can therefore increases the feelings
of shame when the e￿ort is not high. But as the use of ICT may reduce face-to-face interac-
tions and informal contacts, it can consequently thwart the creation of a team spirit and thus
workers’ provision of e￿ort.
Hypothesis 5. Technological changes stimulate electronic communications. On the one
hand ICT uses increase the interdependence of workers, but on the other hand they reduce face-
to-face interactions. Consequently, the global impact of ICT changes on the setting up of a team
spirit and thus on external pressure is quite ambiguous.
Another extrinsic motivation comes from the reciprocity between employers and workers. An
agent is expected to, at least partly, determine his level of motivation considering the behaviours
of others, particularly the employer. In addition to purely self-interested people, there are a
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to experimental economics and the work of Fehr and G￿chter (2000) people cooperate more
than predicted by the self-interested model in response to friendly actions and less in response
to hostile actions. According to Akerlof and Yellen (1990), in the context of work, reciprocity
implies that a fair worker will be honest with an honest employer and will shirk with a dishonest
employer (one that fails to provide a good working environment or a good salary), that is to
say the worker will reduce drastically the level of e￿ort.
With the introduction of high performance work systems and ICT, according to Colvin
(2006) ￿rms place greater value on employees developing ￿rms’ speci￿c competencies. Con-
sequently, ￿rms will try to keep such workers in a context characterized by high churn rates
for workers (Bauer and Bender, 2004). Furthermore, to obtain optimal e￿ort of workers who
develop ICT competences, the ￿rm can choose to reward them by providing good working
conditions.
Hypothesis 6. Technological changes should in￿uence positively the relationships between
employers and employees.
2.3. Identity
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) build a principal-agent model in which they include both in-
centives mechanisms and motivations and introduce the concept of identity. Identity in organ-
isation embodies the extent to which workers identify with their ￿rm and want to achieve its
goal. Thus we can distinguish ￿outsiders￿ who think of themselves as not a part of the ￿rm and
￿insiders￿ who think of themselves as a part of the ￿rm. The cost to obtain high level of e￿ort
is smaller when the worker identi￿es with the ￿rm. Therefore, It can be pro￿table to invest
in ￿motivational capital￿ in order to try to change a worker’s identity from an outsider to an
insider.
They take standard hypotheses concerning the behaviours of workers. The utility is increas-
ing in income, the agent is risk averse and her actions a￿ect the pro￿t of the ￿rm while the
principal can’t observe them. The worker can take the action A at a cost of e￿ort eA or the
action B at a cost of e￿ort eB, with eA  eB. Firm’s revenues are random but conditional on
the choice of action by the worker. When the agent chooses the action A, revenues are high
(πH) with a probability of 1/2 and low (πL) with a probability of 1/2. When the agent chooses
action B, revenues are always low. The principal observe realized revenues and pay the worker
according to the level of revenues, a high salary ( wH) when revenues are high (πH) and a low
salary (wL) when revenues are low (πL). The overall agent’s utility is u(y) − e with u(y) the
utility from income and e the e￿ort.
Then, they introduce utility from identity. Insiders ( N) should act in the ￿rm’s best interest
and their ideal e￿ort is eA and outsiders (O) should choose the least cost action so their ideal
8e￿ort is eB. The utility the worker derives from belonging to the category c = {N;O} is Ic.
Thus the utility the agent loses from diverging from the ideal e￿ort level of her category is
tc|e∗(c) − e| oø tc, where tc is the importance of living up to the ideal.
Linked with the notion of motivations, we can consider that pure intrinsic motivations con-
tribute to the utility from identity of the agent and that tc is in￿uenced by moral motivations
and extrinsic ones. The utility the agent gains from her identity depends on unpaid grati￿ca-
tions she gets from her job. An agent intrinsically motivated by an enriching work will have
a bigger utility than an agent not intrinsically motivated especially when her identity is the
identity of the ￿rm. tc represents the unease of a worker when her actions fail to live up to her
ideal. It can be a function of the predisposition of the worker to feel guilty when her level of
e￿ort is insu￿cient in bond with her moral motivations, of the degree of cooperation between
the employees, of the feeling of belonging to a team ( Rob and Zemsky, 2002) which develops a
feeling of shame3 and ￿nally of the reciprocity existing between the employer and the employee.
Those moral and extrinsic motivations will positively in￿uenced tc and drive workers to provide
the level of e￿ort of her category. Then tc|e∗(c)−e| represents the disutility of the agent when
her e￿ort di￿ers from the optimal e￿ort of her social category.
The overall utility of the worker is: U(y,e,c) = u(y) − e + Ic − tc|e∗(c) − e|
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) assume that the principal wants to obtain the action A whichever
the social category is. Thus the ￿rm’s expected pro￿ts are : Π(c) = 1




The ￿rm maximises the pro￿t subject to an incentive constraint (1) which is the condition
that the worker prefers to do the high-e￿ort action A than the low-e￿ort one B, and a partici-
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Consequently, if the worker has the insider identity, the presence of the identity utility reduce
the wage di￿erential needed to obtain the high-e￿ort level of the action A because the agent
maximises her utility by providing the action A. On the contrary, if the worker identi￿es as an
outsider, the presence of the identity utility increase the wage di￿erential needed to compensate
her for the utility lost when she provides the high-e￿ort level needed to do the action A. The
monetary incentive and motivation by identity are, this way, substitutes, but positive incentives
can be used by the ￿rm to keep insiders in the ￿rm in the context of high churn rate.
3￿Shame exists when others observe non performance and then exert external pressure. In contrast, guilt
arises as internal pressure even when one’s actions are unobservable ￿, Minkler (2004, p. 870).
9As the ￿rm prefers a worker with an insider identity, it’s in the interest of the ￿rm to invest
in ￿motivational capital￿ in order to change a worker’s identity from an outsider to an insider.
ICT use, as we saw before, should modify the motivations of the agents and consequently,
should reinforce the provision of e￿ort by positively in￿uencing the utility the agent obtains
with her work. It can also appear as a token of trust that can reinforce the feelings of shame and
culpability when the ideal of the group is not reached. So we can formulate a last hypothesis
we will test in our empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 7. Giving workers the use of ICT should appeared as an investment in moti-
vational capital which result in changing outsiders in insiders.
3. Data
The data used in this study relates to individuals working and living in the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg. They were collected within the framework of a European project called: European
Social Survey (ESS). This European project was conducted in over 20 countries of the European
continent on nationally representative samples of individuals. It contains information on a wide
range of attitudinal and socio demographic characteristics of individuals. In Luxembourg, an
additional questionnaire was inserted. It provides items on the use of new technologies, both at
home and at work. The data were collected, using face to face interviews, by the CEPS/Instead
thanks to the ￿nancial support from the Luxembourg National Research Fund. The survey 4
was twice realized in 2002-2003 and in 2004-2005, but here, we use the data of the second
round. As we want to analyze the links between ICT and motivations at work, we focus our
attention on the working population and more speci￿cally to employees who are aged between
16 and 65. The numbers of workers interviewed is 706.
3.1. Dependant variables
To obtain productivity gains and to assure their competitiveness, ￿rms need to provide
workers with su￿cient incentives and motivations.
To analyse the links between, on the one hand ICT use and, on the other hand ￿rms’
incentives schemes and workers’ motivations, we constructed proxies of the di￿erent incentives
and motivations from perception of workers about their working conditions 5. In order to test
our hypothesis 1, we analyse a proxy of monitoring de￿ned by a work closely supervised.
To test our hypothesis 2, we consider a variable that measure the use of wage bonus by the
￿rm and a variable that measure the promotion possibilities de￿ned by good opportunities of
advancement. As we said before, to study motivations we can distinguish intrinsic motivations
4In Appendix A we provide descriptive statistics of the survey data.
5The details of the ESS questions and the variables constructed are contained in Appendix B.
10from extrinsic ones. On the one hand, the intrinsic are caught by a proxy of good job in order
to test the hypothesis 3 and a proxy of moral motivations de￿ned by the fact of following rules
even when no one is watching in order to test the hypothesis 4. On the other hand, for the
extrinsic motivations we test the hypothesis 5 by capturing external pressure with the use of
two variables, the need of colleagues’ gratitude and a proxy of team spirit. Finally, we test our
hypothesis 6, the reciprocity between employers and workers, with a dummy characterising the
security of the job o￿ered by the ￿rm to the workers.
3.2. Distinction between insiders and outsiders
To test the hypothesis 7, we seek to distinguish insiders and outsiders to see if o￿ering the
use of ICT to employees has a di￿erent connection with incentives and motivations depending
on the social category of workers.
According to Akerlof and Kranton (2005), we can distinguish the two social categories of
employees by using the degree of loyalty of workers towards their ￿rm or how much they are
proud to be working for their ￿rm. Despite the shortcomings of the concept because ￿ [...] these
responses do not tell us why workers feel this way. Perhaps ￿rms invest in identity. Perhaps
workers select organizations that share their values. Perhaps workers adopt their ￿rms’ values
to minimize cognitive dissonance ￿ (p. 22), it corresponds to the framework they build where
identity is a part of workers’ utility.
From this point of view, in order to distinguish the two populations of workers, we use the
following question: ￿Thinking about the organisation you work for, how much do you agree with
the following statement? I would turn down another job with higher pay in order to stay with
this organisation￿. If the employee agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, he’s considered
as an insider, otherwise the employee is considered as an outsider. In our data, nearly 40% of
employees can be considered as insiders and so 60% as outsiders.
3.3. Independent variables
Our measures of ICT use at work concerns computer and Internet use. They are constructed
has dummy variables that takes the value one when the individual use the ICT at the workplace
and zero otherwise.
Even if we have no information on ￿rms’ choice of organisation and of the possible organi-
sational changes implemented in the last years, we have variables relating to the characteristics
of occupied job. On the one hand, we use information on the diversity of the tasks carried out
in the job to have an idea of employee’s versatility (￿ multi-tasking￿). On the other hand, the
data give information about the ￿exibility of the work schedule i.e. the fact that the worker is
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gives us an idea of ￿exibility in the organisation of the production (￿ ￿exibility￿).
The di￿erent control variables introduced in our empirical analyses concerns numerous as-
pects of workers, of their job and of the ￿rm.The ESS survey provides information on the
worker, that is to say the gender, the age, the highest level of education attained. The sur-
vey also provides information on each worker’s job and on the ￿rm in which he works. More
precisely, we have information on the occupation (5 groups: unskilled workers; skilled workers;
clerks and services workers; technicians; professionals and high level management), if the em-
ployee weekly work more or less than the legal limit (40 hours), the seniority. Concerning the
characteristics of the ￿rm, we introduce the sector as well as the size of the ￿rm.
Table 1 displays the characteristics of workers who use a computer and/or Internet at work.
In the sample there are 59% of workers who use a computer in the workplace and 45% who use
Internet. ICT users stand out from those who do not use, by individual or job characteristics.
Quali￿ed workers employ more widely new technologies than others. Thus, 81.66% of workers
with college graduate use Internet at work against 22.57% of workers with only 0-13 years
spent at school. Near than 90% of professionals and high level management employees use a
computer at work and 80% use Internet. It is the case for less than 30% of skilled workers for
the computer use and 16% for Internet. The proportion of individuals who uses ICT in the
sectors of industry or construct is less important than in the other sectors. Concerning the size
of the ￿rm, it appears that more than 65% of individuals working in ￿rms employing more than
25 persons use a computer and 50% Internet against less than 50% for computer use and 35%
for Internet use in smaller ￿rms.
Table 1: Characteristics of ICT users
Computer Internet
users users




15-29 ans 62.18% 49.08%
30-44 ans 59.87% 46.15%
45 ans et plus 54.22% 41.13%
0-13 years at school 36.80% 22.57%
High School graduate 69.44% 54.55%
College graduate 90.48% 81.66%
Occupation
Working hours≥40h 61.27% 47.69%
Working hours<40h 47.41% 35.42%
Job tenure<3 years 59.09% 44.51%
12Computer Internet
users users
Job tenure≥3 years 58.70% 45.68%
Professionals, high level management 89.47% 80.39%
Technicians 83.93% 67.25%
Clerks and services workers 55.24% 35.95%
Skilled workers 26.97% 16.30%
Unskilled workers 15.79% 8.03%
Firm characteristics
Size less than 10 employees 41.23% 34.17%
Size between 10 and 24 employees 47.15% 33.33%
Size between 25 and 99 employees 67.41% 52.55%
Size between 100 and 499 employees 67.31% 55.35%
500 employees and more 67.12% 48.67%
Industry, construct 37.74% 26.54%
Trade, transport, ﬁnancial services, property business 68.70% 47.23%
Education, civil services, health services 61.77% 55.56%
Note: 67.12% of workers who work in a ￿rm employing more than 499
persons use a computer at work and 48.67% use Internet.
4. Econometric method
A ￿rst estimate of the links between ICT and the di￿erent mechanisms of incentives and
motivations (Y ) can be obtained with Chi-square tests. We compare the average value of Y for
workers who use the ICT (T = 1) and for the workers who do not (T = 0). This benchmark
estimator is generally called ￿na￿ve￿. However, this benchmark estimator raises some selection
problems induced by workers’ heterogeneity (due to age, occupation, education,...) and ￿rms’
heterogeneity (size, organisation,...), because we can’t introduce control variables with this
methodology.
To handle this problem, in a second estimate, we choose to perform probit regressions of
the di￿erent incentives and motivations variables on ICT use, including the control variables
concerning the worker and the ￿rm. For each incentives and motivations we have a dummy
variable (Yi) which is ascribed the value 1 if the worker (i = 1,...,n) announces that his work
shows the characteristic, 0 if not.
We consider the carrying out of the binary dependent variable as the result from a rule of
decision. This rule is a mechanism associating the exogenous variables xi with the observation
of the event {Yi = 0} or {Yi = 1}. Thus, Yi = 1 if y∗
i > 0 and Yi = 0 if y∗
ie ≤ 0, with the latent
variable y∗
i = β0.xi + i where xi is the vector containing the exogenous variables and β the
vector of parameters that captures the in￿uence of the exogenous variables. We assume that
the error term i is distributed as a normal i.i.d. variable. The probability that the work shows
13a particular characteristic is written as follows:
Prob (Yi = 1) = Prob (β
0.xi + i > 0)
= 1 − F(−β
0.xi)
And the probability that the work doesn’t show a particular characteristic is:
Prob (Yi = 0) = F(−β
0.xi)













[Yi log (1 − F(−β
0.xi)) + (1 − Yi) log (F(−β
0.xi))]
But another problem stems from the fact that the impact of ICT may not be linear. The
e￿ect, indeed, can be di￿erent for distinct groups of workers.
That’s why, in a third estimates, we use propensity score matching estimators, as Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) recommend. We can formalize the access to ICT in the
workplace by a random variable T, which takes value 1 if the individual reaches the program
(i.e. has the access to an ICT) and 0 if not. The variable of interest (Y ) which denotes
the fact that the worker i has such or such incentives or motivations to provide the optimal
e￿ort is described by two probabilities ( ˆ P(Yi = 1); ˆ P(Yi = 0)) conditional on the access to the
￿treatment￿ (T). For a worker i, we do not observe at the same time the ￿tted probability of
having an incentive or a motivation ˆ P1(Yi = 1) if the worker use the ICT (Ti = 1) and the
￿tted probability ˆ P0(Yi = 1) if the worker do not use the ICT (Ti = 0).
In the data, we only observe:
ˆ P(Yi = 1) = Ti ˆ P1(Yi = 1) + (1 − Ti) ˆ P0(Yi = 1)
For each worker, the ￿causal e￿ect￿ (Rubin, 1974) of the treatment Ci is de￿ned by the
di￿erence between what would be the situation of the individual if she were treated ( i.e if she
used ICT at work) and what it would be if she were not treated: Ci = ˆ P1(Yi = 1)− ˆ P0(Yi = 1)
Given that our data are not experimental, we do not observe for a same individual the
two ￿tted probabilities and consequently this parameter cannot be identi￿ed. So, we need to
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ATT = E( ˆ P1(Y = 1) − ˆ P0(Y = 1)/T = 1)
= E( ˆ P(Y = 1) − ˆ P0(Y = 1)/T = 1)
= E( ˆ P(Y = 1) − E( ˆ P0(Y = 1)/X,T = 1)/T = 1)
= E( ˆ P(Y = 1) − E( ˆ P0(Y = 1)/X,T = 0)/T = 1)
= E( ˆ P(Y = 1) − E( ˆ P(Y = 1)/X,T = 0)/T = 1)
In order to obtain an estimation of the ATT we use information available on the workers to
build, for each individual using ICT, a ￿counter-factual￿ i.e. an estimate of what would be his
situation if he had not used the ICT.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we can matched individuals who take part in the
treatment and those who not, according to the estimation of the probability to be involved in
the use of ICT, the propensity score: S(X) = Pr(T = 1/X). Furthermore, they show that the
propensity score summarizes enough information to compute the estimation of the ATT.
The propensity score provides a comparability criterion between the ￿treated￿ group and
the ￿untreated￿ or control one. If the score tends to be high for the people treated and weak for
the untreated, it implies that the treated and the untreated people show di￿erent individual
characteristics. There is, thus, a selection bias in so far as the treated use ICT because of their
individual characteristics.
Following Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), we can thwart the selection bias, and construct a
group of treated and a group of untreated workers comparables in accordance to their propensity
score6. In practice, it implies that the sample has to be restricted to a common support of
the empirical distributions of the scores respectively for observations such as Ti = 1 and for
observations such as Ti = 0.
Then, we use the following non parametric Kernel matching estimator which under some
regularity assumptions is convergent and asymptotically normal:


























Where K is a normal kernel function, h is the bandwidth parameter of the estimation, I1
denotes the treated group, I0 the untreated or control group, N1 the number of individuals in
I1.
6This methodology is classically used by authors analyzing the impact of organisational change on working
conditions or wages. See for example, Askenazy and Caroli (2006); Diaye, Greenan, and Urdanivia (2006).
15As we use the Kernel methodology, the right term inside the brackets is a weighted average
of the observations in the control group. Consequently each individual j in the untreated group
takes part in the construction of a counter-factual of i in the treated group. And the importance
of j ∈ I0 in this construction varies as the distance between his propensity score and that of
i ∈ I1.
5. Results
In the following subsections, we analyse the links between incentives, motivations and ICT
use at work using three methods: na￿ve estimates, probit regressions and the propensity score
method. As the uses of computer and of Internet are highly correlated and it makes di￿cult
the implementation of the matching estimators, so we choose to make distinct analyses. The
computer use is seen here as a tool allowing tasks codi￿cation and the transfers of information
and knowledge between the di￿erent departments of the ￿rm in a short time. The Internet use
is seen here as a tool promoting communications with the outside, information research, and
consequently can improve tasks execution. But, as the access to Internet is linked with the use
of a computer, the results will therefore include at the same time the use of computer software
and of communication tools o￿ered by the Web as e-mail and bulletin boards, for example 7.
The ￿rst column of the results reports na￿ve estimates for computer use (respectively the
fourth column for Internet use) i.e. the di￿erence in the percentage of workers who have such
or such incentives or motivations to work hard, between workers who use the ICT and workers
who do not. To go further, we estimate probit equations for the probability of being motivated
by such or such incentives or motivations. The second column for computer use (respectively
the ￿fth for Internet use) presents the marginal e￿ects 8 associated with the coe￿cient obtained
in the probit regressions. Our third analyze concern the use of a propensity score method 9.
The third column for computer use (respectively the sixth for Internet use) reports the ATT
estimated with the Kernel matching method.
With the results from the analysis of ICT use on the incentives and motivations to work
hard, it seems that heterogeneity biases are quite large. The coe￿cients estimated either using
the probit methodology or using the propensity score method are quite di￿erent from the na￿ve
estimates. The e￿ects of the ICT use on incentives or motivations to work hard are increasingly
small when we correct for the heterogeneity of workers and ￿rms. Moreover, for some incentives
7Details concerning the results of the di￿erent estimators are available on request.
8Each line in the second column or in the ￿fth one corresponds to a di￿erent probit.
9The ￿rst step in the method is to estimate a model Probit explaining the probability for an individual to
have an access to the use of computer or the Internet according to the ICT considered, in order to perform the
computation of propensity scores. To match our individuals, we retain a limited number of variables among the
control variables included in the standard Probit. Non-signi￿cant variables in the estimation of the access to
an ICT are, indeed, removed.
16or motivations, the positive link with ICT use disappears when we introduce more and more
corrections of the heterogeneity bias i.e. when we use the probit methodology and then the
propensity score.
5.1. ICT and incentives
Table 2 presents the results of the tests of the hypotheses concerning the links between ICT
and negative and positive mechanisms of incentives. We analyze the results obtained from the
whole sample and on the two subpopulations of workers with or without the identity of the
￿rm in order to see if the e￿ects are more present for the population of outsider than for the
population of insider in order to test our ￿nal hypothesis on an investment in motivational
capital permitted by the investment in ICT.
Table 2: ICT use and incentivesa
Computer use Internet use
χ2 Probit ATT χ2 Probit ATT
test test
Whole -8.71%** -0.04 -0.004 -13.56%*** -0.108** -0.021
Hypothesis 1 sample (0.052) (0.015) (0.049) (0.015)
Monitoring Insider 3.66% 0.104 0.022 -6.19% -0.042 0.032
(0.082) (0.048) (0.081) (0.025)
Outsider -17.9%*** -0.148** -0.009 -18.97%*** -0.177*** -0.031
(0.070) (0.027) (0.064) (0.024)
Whole 6.43%* 0.081* 0.032** 6.94%** 0.085** 0.012
Hypothesis 2 sample (0.043) (0.013) (0.043) (0.110)
Wage bonus Insider 9.32%* 0.128* 0.03* 12.58%** 0.19*** 0.023
(0.066) (0.018) (0.071) (0.024)
Outsider 4.32% 0.055 0.014 2.59% 0.001 0.006
(0.058) (0.023) (0.056) (0.019)
Whole 16.92%*** 0.119** 0.025 13.52%*** 0.092* 0.023
sample (0.052) (0.022) (0.050) (0.017)
Promotions Insider 18.77%*** 0.184** 0.009 13.74%** 0.196** 0.053*
(0.085) (0.037) (0.085) (0.031)
Outsider 13.6%*** 0.066 0.032 10.73%** 0.006 0.032**
(0.069) (0.026) (0.064) (0.016)
a For the probit, the marginal e￿ects are provided. Standard errors are in parentheses,
in the Kernel estimates they are computed using bootstrap. *, **, *** indicate statistical
signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The use of ICT at work has no or little link with the negative incentive tested. The ATT is,
indeed, non signi￿cant for all samples. However, the probit estimates underline that the use of
ICT and in particular the joint use of the computer and the Internet (caught by right columns
in table 2) appears to reduce the likelihood of the resort by the employer to the direct control
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see that this e￿ect appears only for the subpopulation of outsider.
The results of the test of hypothesis 2, concerning the links between ICT use and positive
incentives mechanisms, show that at the level of the whole sample, ICT are associated with
greater use of positive incentives. This e￿ect is underlined by ￿naive￿ comparisons and by probit
estimates, but not, however, by matching models. When we distinguish insiders from outsiders,
it appears that the use of ICT is correlated with monetary rewards only for the workers with
the identity of the ￿rm. Through these monetary rewards, theoretically less used for insiders
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2005), in the context of skills acquisition via the use of ICT, the ￿rm can
recognize the value of these skills in order to retain insiders and to promote the development
of pure intrinsic motivation (crowd in e￿ect). At the level of promotions, the results of the
ATT show that, for the two subpopulations studied, the joint use of a computer and Internet
is correlated with a feeling of having opportunities for advancement. Thus, for insiders, the
ICT users have a 5.3 points higher probability of thinking that they can get a promotion than
non users against 3.2 points for outsiders. Therefore, the results substantiate for the most part
hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.
5.2. ICT and intrinsic motivations
The results on the links between the ICT use and intrinsic motivations of employees are
shown in table 3.
Table 3: ICT use and intrinsic motivations a
Computer use Internet use
χ2 Probit ATT χ2 Probit ATT
test test
Whole 24.54%*** 0.092** 0.045*** 22.16%*** 0.043 0.018**
Hypothesis 3 sample (0.036) (0.017) (0.034) (0.007)
Pure Insider 26.80%*** 0.165*** 0.046* 22.05%*** 0.089* 0.006
intrinsic (0.059) (0.028) (0.052) (0.016)
motivations Outsider 21.62%*** 0.022 0.037** 20.97%*** 0.014 0.039***
(0.042) (0.017) (0.043) (0.010)
Whole -13.06%*** -0.041 0.01 -7.68%** 0.033 -0.005
Hypothesis 4 sample (0.050) (0.110) (0.048) (0.010)
Moral Insider -3.62% 0.128 0.016 -1.84% 0.138* -0.004
motivations (0.082) (0.031) (0.077) (0.023)
Outsider -19.75%*** -0.147** -0.012 -12.31%** -0.049 0.006
(0.066) (0.013) (0.063) (0.013)
a For the probit, the marginal e￿ects are provided. Standard errors are in parentheses,
in the Kernel estimates they are computed using bootstrap. *, **, *** indicate statistical
signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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As shown by Deci (1971) or Minkler (2004), it shall promote the positive assessment by the
employee of her work and therefore her pure intrinsic motivation. Pure intrinsic motivations
implies the delivery of the optimal e￿ort (eA) without any ￿nancial compensation. Thus, for
the whole population, the average treatment e￿ect is signi￿cant and shows that workers using
a computer at work have a 4.5 points higher probability of being motivated by an interesting
work, and 1.8 for Internet users. In addition, the results of the ATT show that this link
exists for the two subpopulations for the use of the computer and for the subpopulation of
outsiders for the use of Internet (combined with a computer). Regarding the impact of ICT
on moral motivations, the di￿erent methods used don’t reveal a link between ICT use and the
￿integrity￿ to do the work in the interest of the ￿rm. In conclusion, the results provide support
to hypothesis 3 formulated above and display a lack of link between ICT and moral motivations.
Thus the results don’t permit to conclude on the ambiguity between ICT use and integrity of
the agent.
5.3. ICT and extrinsic motivations
Table 4 provides the results of the tests of the hypotheses concerning the links between ICT
use and extrinsic motivations.
Table 4 shows the test of hypothesis 5 on the link between ICT use and external pressures
exerted by the look of the others depending on the proximity between workers in the ￿rm.
External pressures a￿ect the level of e￿ort thanks to the feeling of shame the employee develops
when his e￿ort diverges from the ideal. The results reveal little links between ICT and the
shame feeling generated by the need for recognition. Regarding the links between ICT use
and the development of a team spirit, the results of the matching method highlight a positive
correlation for the whole population and for the subpopulation of outsiders. This team spirit
can generate the feeling of shame recognized by Akerlof and Kranton (2005) as reducing the
value of the agent when she doesn’t conform to the interests of the employer. The results are
used to decide on the ambiguity of links between ICT use and external pressure as formulated
in the hypothesis 5 and underline a positive link between ICT use and the development of a
team spirit. Moreover, the results don’t support the hypothesis 6 concerning the link between
ICT use and reciprocity captured by job security. However, we should noticed that this measure
of reciprocity can be irrelevant in a country where the unemployment rate is less than 5%, and
therefore job security is not important for an employee who knows that she can ￿nd without
di￿culty another job if she loses the current one.
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Computer use Internet use
χ2 Probit ATT χ2 Probit ATT
test test
Whole -5.07% 0.018 0.007 -3.67% 0.027 0.019
Hypothesis 5 sample (0.053) (0.017) (0.050) (0.016)
Need of Insider 5.63% 0.255*** -0.027 6.43% 0.242*** 0.031
colleagues’ (0.087) (0.037) (0.084) (0.030)
gratitude Outsider -12.47%*** -0.118* -0.001 -9.42%* -0.055 -0.043***
(0.070) (0.013) (0.065) (0.017)
Whole 12.54%*** 0.025 0.024*** 10.59%*** 0.014 0.028**
sample (0.040) (0.008) (0.038) (0.011)
Team Insider 9.86%** -0.032 0.014 3.30% -0.134*** 0.036
spirit (0.057) (0.034) (0.061) (0.028)
Outsider 14.66%*** 0.049 0.043*** 16.04%*** 0.094* 0.034**
(0.055) (0.013) (0.050) (0.012)
Whole 6.7%** 0.045 -0.002 6.23%** 0.037 0.008
sample (0.042) (0.013) (0.039) (0.012)
Hypothesis 6 Insider 4.54% -0.007 0.017 5.70% 0.03 0.012
Job security (0.039) (0.017) (0.040) (0.020)
Outsider 7.82%* 0.092 -0.003 6.11% 0.062 0.024
(0.064) (0.017) (0.059) (0.022)
a For the probit, the marginal e￿ects are provided. Standard errors are in parentheses,
in the Kernel estimates they are computed using bootstrap. *, **, *** indicate statistical
signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
5.4. ICT and the investment in motivational capital
When the two subpopulations of employees are distinguished according to whether the
employee has or not the ￿rm identity, the results show that for employees’ motivations, the links
between ICT and intrinsic or extrinsic motivations are more present and/or more important
for the subpopulation of outsiders than for the subpopulation of insiders. Thus, this result
provides support to the hypothesis 7. Consequently, ICT use can appear as an investment in
motivational capital that can ultimately transform outsiders into insiders.
Finally, even if the monetary rewards are theoretically less used for insiders ( Akerlof and
Kranton, 2005), the results highlight that positive incentive mechanisms are linked to ICT use
especially for the population of insiders. It seems that as ￿rm obtains easily the high level of
e￿ort with insiders, which in turn provides high incomes, the ￿rm chooses monetary rewards or
promotions to retain those employees in the context of high churn rate and the search of skilled
workers by ￿rms. Especially in a country where the unemployment rate is low and consequently
the opportunities of ￿nding a better job higher for high skilled workers.
206. Conclusion
The large di￿usion of ICT associated with the di￿usion of high performance work practices
since the early 1990s has raised concerns about the impact of these changes on productivity.
Some recent studies underline a positive impact of ICT and innovative practices of work on
individuals’ and ￿rms’ productivity. In this context of wide changes, our work seeks to study
how the ￿rm can play on incentives and motivations through workers’ access to ICT to obtain
a high amount of e￿ort and to get the productivity e￿ects highlighted in the literature.
Grounded in the economic literature as well as in works developed in sociology and psychol-
ogy, we seek to evaluate empirically, in this article, the links between ICT use and incentives,
motivations. The existing works show a positive impact of technological and organisational
changes on productivity without an interest in the mechanisms of incentives and motivations
underlying in the getting of the optimal e￿ort of employees for the ￿rm. Based on works
concerning incentives and motivations and works on ICT use in ￿rms, we have formulated six
hypotheses on the relationship between the use of ICT in the workplace and the mechanisms of
incentives and motivations. Moreover, by mobilizing the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
we study the relationship of incentives and motivations in an economic model construct to
study the e￿ort of employees. These authors, by distinguishing two types of employees, holders
of ￿rm identity and the others, can understand the interest of an investment in motivational
capital to get a high e￿ort level of employees. This led us to formulate a last hypothesis on the
fact that access to ICT use can be a possible investment in motivational capital.
To test the hypotheses formulated, we use a representative sample of individuals working
in Luxembourg surveyed in 2004-2005. We perform three analyses. A ￿rst evaluation of the
consequence of ICT on the indicators of incentives and motivations is computed by comparing
the average value of the indicator for workers who use ICT (computer, Internet) and for workers
who do not. However, this na￿ve estimator raises some selection problems induced by workers’
and ￿rms’ heterogeneity. To handle this problem, we choose to perform probit regressions of
the di￿erent incentives and motivations variables on ICT use, including a number of controls
like age, education, seniority and ￿rm’s characteristics like proxies of the organisation of work.
But another problem stems from the fact that the impact of ICT may not be linear. In this
case, as Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) recommend, we use propensity score matching estimators.
The results indicate that ICT use is associated with a less use of negative incentive mech-
anism linked to the increasing di￿culty to control workers via a direct supervision because of
a growing autonomy permitted by the introduction of ICT and of new organizational prac-
tices. Instead of these negative incentives, ￿rms seem to use more positive incentives such as
the use of monetary rewards when the level of e￿ort is considered su￿cient by the employer.
Concerning the links between ICT use (computer and/or Internet) and employees’ motivations,
the analyses show that by giving the possibility to use ICT at the workplace, the ￿rm creates
21an enriching work environment that in￿uences positively intrinsic motivations of workers. In
addition, the use of ICT is positively correlated with the development of a team spirit within
the organisation that can generate shame if the level of e￿ort is insu￿cient and thus in￿uence
positively the level of e￿ort. Finally, with the distinction of two subpopulations according to
the ownership of the ￿rm identity or not (insider vs. outsider), ICT have more links with the
motivations of outsiders, and consequently can appear and as an investment in motivational
capital that can transform outsiders into insiders.
ICT use is therefore associated with greater intrinsic motivation and can create a team
spirit which can generate shame that leads to a highest level of employees’ e￿ort. ICT are also
linked to a reduction in the use of negative incentive mechanisms replaced by rewards when
the level of e￿ort is known. The possible e￿ects of crowd out created by the direct supervision
of workers are pull away excluded and thus can’t in￿uence badly the provision of the e￿ort
by employees. Conversely positive incentive mechanisms used in the subpopulation of insiders
can, through the crowd in e￿ect, strengthen pure intrinsic motivations and the level of e￿ort to
work, to create and transfer knowledge. In consequence, ￿rm can choose to reward the e￿orts
of employees who acquired new speci￿cs skills needed by the ￿rm to be competitive and to
retain insiders in the context of high churn rates of skilled people.
Finally we need to notice that we are conscious of the di￿culties to disentangle ICT and
innovative work practices in studying what can encourage individuals to work in the interest
of the ￿rm. For example, it seems that even if new technologies are put at the service of
organisational strategies, the impact on workers motivations mainly determined simultaneously
by ICT and innovative work practice. Thus, the use of computer or Internet cannot by itself
measure the possible e￿ect of team work on external pressure while organisational changes
can provide an answer. It would be necessary to investigate more the joint e￿ect of ICT
and organisational changes. Moreover, further researches should resort to other methods of
matching estimators to check the robustness of the results obtained here. An alternative way
of Kernel estimates concerning the matching of treated and control units can consist of taking






Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Organisation of work
Multi-tasking 0.7969 0.40 0.8653 0.34 0.8871 0.32
Flexibility 0.3179 0.47 0.3702 0.48 0.3961 0.49
Individual characteristics
Sexe (Male) 0.6091 0.49 0.6234 0.49 0.6395 0.48
15-29 years 0.2309 0.42 0.2419 0.43 0.2508 0.43
30-44 years 0.4419 0.50 0.4539 0.50 0.4514 0.50
45 years and more 0.3272 0.47 0.3042 0.46 0.2978 0.46
0-13 years at school 0.4958 0.50 0.3092 0.46 0.2476 0.43
High School graduate 0.2649 0.44 0.3117 0.46 0.3197 0.47
College Graduate 0.2394 0.43 0.3791 0.49 0.4326 0.50
Employment
Working hours 40.08 10.55 41.63 10.21 42.07 10.28
Job tenure < 3 years 0.2589 0.44 0.2594 0.44 0.2539 0.44
Unskilled workers 0.1941 0.40 0.0524 0.22 0.0345 0.18
Skilled workers 0.1303 0.34 0.0599 0.24 0.0470 0.21
Professional, high level management 0.2167 0.41 0.3392 0.47 0.3856 0.49
Technicians 0.2422 0.43 0.3516 0.48 0.3605 0.48
Clerks and services workers 0.2167 0.41 0.1970 0.40 0.1724 0.38
Firm characteristics
Less than 10 employees 0.1727 0.38 0.1178 0.32 0.1293 0.34
10-24 employees 0.1856 0.39 0.1454 0.35 0.1356 0.34
25-99 employees 0.1971 0.40 0.2281 0.42 0.2271 0.42
100-499 employees 0.2288 0.42 0.2632 0.44 0.2776 0.45
500 employees and more 0.2158 0.41 0.2456 0.43 0.2303 0.42
Industry, 0.2295 0.42 0.1496 0.36 0.1348 0.34
construct
Trade, transport, ﬁnancial 0.4348 0.50 0.4514 0.50 0.4545 0.50
services, property business
Education, civil & 0.3314 0.47 0.3940 0.49 0.4075 0.49
health services




My work is closely supervised - agree or strongly agree.
B.2. Positive Incentives
Wage bonus
My wage or salary depends on the amount of e￿ort I put into my work - quite true or very
true.
Promotions
My opportunities for advancement are good - agree or strongly agree.
B.3. Intrinsic motivations
Pure intrinsic motivations
Based on the answers to the following questions.
• My job requires that I keep learning new things;
• I can decide the organization of the daily work independently.
Dichotomous variables were created, with 1 representing quite true or very true. The sum of
these two variables is a measure of good job content. A dummy variable was created for workers
reporting positive job content for at least one aspect.
Moral motivations
￿I like following rules even when no-one is watching￿. The variable is based on the answer of
the following question. Choose the description that shows how much each person is or is not
like you. He believes that people should do what they’re told, he thinks people should follow




• Need of colleagues’ gratitude
￿I want people to admire what I do￿. The variable is based on the answer of the following
question. Choose the description that shows how much each person is or is not like you.
It’s important to him to show his abilities, he wants people to admire what he does:
somewhat like me, like me, very much like me.
• Team spirit
I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed - quite true or very true.
Fairness
Job Security : My job is secure - quite true or very true.
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